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Consciousness: Don't Give Up on the Brain

Kenneth Aizawa

Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement July 7, 2010 DOI: 10.1017/s1358246110000032 (opens in new tab)

Study at a glance

AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Citations 13
Key points Argues that Noë's extended mind account of consciousness is flawed, based on problematic neuroplasticity evidence, difficulties with paralysis cases, and the existence of metamers and visual illusions that challenge the view.

Abstract

Abstract In the extended mind literature, one sometimes finds the claim that there is no neural correlate of consciousness. Instead, there is a biological or ecological correlate of consciousness. Consciousness, it is claimed, supervenes on an entire organism in action. Alva Noë is one of the leading proponents of such a view. This paper resists Noë's view. First, it challenges the evidence he offers from neuroplasticity. Second, it presses a problem with paralysis. Third, it draws attention to a challenge from the existence of metamers and visual illusions.