Theoretical Controversies—Terminological Biases: Consciousness Revisited

Language shapes how we think about consciousness, and this linguistic influence creates philosophical difficulties that science alone cannot resolve. The author examines how the concept of consciousness has changed through philosophical investigation and how this relates to current scientific practice. By analyzing characteristics of linguistic expression that lead to paradoxical situations, the argument shows that language imposes limits on unifying scientific findings. The paper concludes by considering recent radical philosophical positions that offer new frameworks for understanding consciousness and mental phenomena, while acknowledging the barriers these perspectives face when attempting to integrate scientific results.

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Abstract

Although scientific practice sometimes encounters philosophical difficulties, it cannot shoulder the burden of resolving them. This can lead to controversies. An unavoidable difficulty is rooted in the linguistic attitude, i.e., in the fact that to a considerable extent we express our thoughts in words. I will attempt to illuminate some important characteristics of linguistic expression which lead to paradoxical situations, identifiable thanks to philosophy. In my argument, I will investigate how the notion of consciousness has altered over the course of philosophical investigation and how it relates to recent scientific practice. In conclusion, I will focus on a few recent so-called radical positions in philosophy with regard to a framework within which consciousness and more generally mental phenomena can be regarded in a new light, as well as on the barriers we face when trying to unify scientific results.