The text argues that internal, organic sensations form the basis of consciousness of life and self and are integral to every feeling. This explains the natural linguistic affinity between feelings and self-awareness, as seen in expressions like "sense of self" in English, "sentiment du moi" in French, and "das Ichgefuhl" in German, which feel more fitting than terms involving representation or mental imagery. However, the self is not itself a feeling because no feeling is as constant or recurrent as the self. Nonetheless, the self is closer to emotive states than to representations or mental images.
Some theories hold that conscious phenomena arise solely from brain activity, while others see them as emerging from the interaction between embodied agents and their environment. This paper examines whether these divergent views apply at different scales, as in physics, or can be reconciled. By analyzing how the term "representation" is used, the author suggests it may help bridge the gap between these poles over the long term. The argument draws on philosophical insights from Descartes, James, Wittgenstein, and Merleau-Ponty, as well as global workspace theory and embodied and enacted cognition. The author proposes that a broader investigative horizon will reduce ambiguity around the concept of representation.