The global workspace theory, the phenomenal concept strategy, and the distribution of consciousness.

Peter Carruthers claims that the global workspace theory of consciousness leaves no facts about animal consciousness, and this problem extends to other cognitive theories, threatening the entire field. However, this argument also eliminates facts about human consciousness. The key flawed assumption is that scientific theories must explain away the explanatory gap. An alternative strategy is proposed: introspectable inferential connections from phenomenal concepts to functional concepts allow scientists to identify the global workspace through shared capacities in animals and humans, better reflecting actual scientific practice.

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Abstract

Peter Carruthers argues that the global workspace theory implies there are no facts of the matter about animal consciousness. The argument is easily extended to other cognitive theories of consciousness, posing a general problem for consciousness studies. But the argument proves too much, for it also implies that there are no facts of the matter about human consciousness. A key assumption is that scientific theories of consciousness must explain away the explanatory gap. I criticize this assumption and point to an alternative strategy for defending scientific theories of consciousness, one that better reflects the ongoing scientific practice. I argue there are introspectable inferential connections from phenomenal concepts to functional concepts that scientists can use to individuate the global workspace in terms of capacities that animals and humans share.