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Stop Caring about Consciousness

P. Carruthers

Philosophical Topics November 11, 2021 DOI: 10.5840/philtopics20204811 (opens in new tab)

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Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Key points Argues that global workspace theory plus the phenomenal-concept strategy yields a fully reductive explanation of consciousness as globally broadcast representational content, so qualia and mental paint do not exist. On this basis, the author contends that questions about which other creatures are phenomenally conscious are unimportant and usually lack a factual answer; what matters is a multidimensional similarity space of functionally organized minds.

Abstract

ABSTRACT:The best empirically grounded theory of first-personal phenomenal consciousness is global workspace theory. This, combined with the success of the phenomenal-concept strategy, means that consciousness can be fully reductively explained in terms of globally broadcast representational content. So there are no qualia (and there is no mental paint). As a result, the question of which other creatures besides ourselves are phenomenally conscious is of no importance, and doesn’t admit of a factual answer in most cases. What is real, and what does matter, is a multidimensional similarity space of functionally organized minds.

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