Why We Must Care About Animal Consciousness: Against Carruthers’ Nihilism
Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology March 28, 2025 DOI: 10.5007/1808-1711.2025.e94823 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Animal consciousness Science of consciousness Philosophy of consciousness Carruthers Representation Animal cognition |
| Key points | Argues that Carruthers' position that there is no fact of the matter about animal consciousness is internally contradictory and that animal consciousness deserves attention from philosophy and cognitive science. |
Abstract
One of the most challenging positions in contemporary philosophy of animal consciousness is that proposed by Peter Carruthers (2018a, 2018b, 2019, 2020). According to Carruthers, there is no fact of the matter about whether animals instantiate conscious states. This radical conclusion arises from the conjunction of two theses he endorses: the global workspace theory and the phenomenal concept strategy. This paper argues against Carruthers’ radical viewpoint. Its structure is as follows. First, I will present Carruthers’ theses on consciousness, such as the all-or-nothing characterization of consciousness and the distinction between ‘qualia realism’ and ‘qualia irrealism’. Subsequently, I will provide a brief overview of the global workspace theory and the phenomenal concept strategy. Next, I will reconstruct the arguments that underpin Carruthers’ skepticism about attributing consciousness to animals. Finally, I will present two arguments that challenge Carruthers’ position, highlighting inherent contradictions within his project. Contrary to Carruthers’ controversial assertion (2020, p. 18), I will conclude that animal consciousness deserves attention from both philosophy and the cognitive sciences.