The Cognitive and Neural Dimensions of Consciousness in Self-Inquiry Practice
Reza Maleeh, Shaghayegh Konjedi
Mind and Matter June 30, 2026 DOI: 10.53765/mm2026.57 (opens in new tab) via Semantic Scholar
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractSelf-inquiry, the contemplative practice taught by Ramana Maharshi, can be understood as a form of self-aware open monitoring of mind wandering. Practitioners non-reactively observe spontaneous thoughts while repeatedly redirecting attention to the sense of being the experiencer, without fixing on any object. This provisional subject-object distinction helps loosen identification with self-narratives. As the practice deepens, the distinction dissolves, revealing the self as non-dual awareness—pre-reflective, intransitive, and free of subject-object structure. The authors propose this cognitive model to complement Maharshi's phenomenological description, drawing on findings from cognitive neuroscience and contemplative science.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Intervention | Self-inquiry |
| Keywords | Philosophy Psychology |
| Key finding | Proposes that Ramana Maharshi's self-inquiry can be modeled as a form of self-aware open monitoring of mind wandering that progressively disengages self-narrative and ownership attribution, culminating in recognition of non-dual awareness. |
Abstract
Ramana Maharshi’s practice of self-inquiry is a contemplative method aimed at investigating the nature of the “I” in order to loosen egoic identification and realize the self as non-dual awareness. His teachings emphasize that the true self is ever-present, self-aware, and not constituted by mental constructs. In this article, we propose a cognitive model in which self-inquiry can be understood as a form of self-aware open monitoring of mind wandering, oriented toward tracing the “I”-thought to its source, which Maharshi describes as non-dual awareness or the true self. This account is supported by findings from cognitive neuroscience and contemplative science. During self-inquiry, practitioners adopt a non-reactive stance toward spontaneous mental contents, while repeatedly redirecting attention toward the subject of experience – the sense of being the experiencer – without stabilizing attention on a fixed object. This provisional distinction between the observing subject and the contents of mind wandering functions instrumentally, enabling progressive disengagement from self-narrative and ownership attribution. As inquiry deepens, this distinction itself becomes transparent, giving way to the recognition of the self as non-dual awareness – pre-reflectively self-aware, intransitive, and not organized by subject-object structure. This cognitive framing is not intended to replace Maharshi’s own phenomenological description of self-inquiry, but to complement it by articulating how the practice may engage known attentional, meta-aware, and self-referential processes.