Quantum Indeterminacy and Libertarian Panpsychism

The standard argument against free will holds that if volition depended on physically indeterministic processes, actions would be random and lack control. Quantum indeterminacy is often dismissed as irrelevant to libertarian agent-causation theories because interfering with quantum probability distributions would violate those laws. This paper challenges that assumption, presenting a concrete example in which a hypothetical agent with access to the temporal ordering of events can predetermine the outcome of a process without altering its defining probability laws. This conclusion is then used as the basis for a libertarian panpsychist interpretive model.

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Abstract

The "consequence argument", together with the "luck objection", which are summed up by the "standard argument against free will", state that if our volition were dependent on physical causally indeterministic processes, our actions would lack control and, thereby, result in random behavior that would be a mere matter of luck and chance. In particular, quantum indeterminacy is supposed to be of no use in support of libertarian agent-causation theories because any volitional act interfering with the probability distributions defining quantum laws would lead to its violation. Building upon recent conjectural work questioning this assumption (Clarke 2010, Kastner 2016, Masi 2023), it is shown, with a concrete example involving quantum indeterminacy, how a hypothetical agent with access to the temporal ordering of events can pre-determine the result of a process taking place in time without modifying the probability laws defining it. This conclusion is then taken as a basis for a libertarian panpsychist interpretative model.