Structural Constraints to Compare Phenomenal Experience
J. Díaz-Boils, Naotsugu Tsuchiya, CM. Signorelli
Mind and Matter June 30, 2026 DOI: 10.53765/mm2026.31 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Epistemology |
| Key points | Proposes that a partial order structure based on layers of potentiality and actuality shows that comparisons between phenomenal experiences are only partial, implying consciousness evolves as diverse modes rather than an absolute scale. |
Abstract
The article introduces a partial order structure to study the relations between levels and contents of conscious experience within a formal and mathematical model. Inspired by Husserl’s phenomenology, our account models structural aspects of experiences as layers that can be experienced in potentiality or in actuality, composing further experiences and imposing an order among them. From our simple set of assumptions and formal analysis we conclude that a comparison among phenomenal experiences is only partial. Some experiences are comparable (e.g. experiences that carry different aspects in actuality and potentiality), but others are not (e.g. experiences that carry the same number, but different aspects, in actuality). These formal results imply the evolution of consciousness as diverse modes of experiencing, instead of an absolute scale along species. Moreover, our methodology also elucidates structural constraints from conceptual assumptions to mathematical structure, and mathematical structure to interpretations about phenomenal experiences. This makes the mathematical formalization transparent, opening new avenues to explore the consequences of formal models based on our partial order layer structure.