Fenomenologia, psicologia ed embodiment: a proposito di Filosofia come scienza rigorosa di Edmund Husserl

The paper examines the relationship between the empirical subject of psychology and the pure subject of phenomenology, arguing that despite their closeness, phenomenological analysis does not embrace naturalistic presuppositions. It contrasts two contemporary approaches to consciousness: an embodied view that expects neuroscience to fully explain psychical phenomena, leading toward a mathematized psyche through complexity sciences, and a phenomenological approach grounded in Husserl's concept of hyle, which sees subjectivity as bound to sensory experience. The latter finds support in neuroscience's advancements, while the former seeks scientific status through formalization.

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Abstract

Phenomenology, Psychology, and Embodiment. Reflections on Edmund Husserl’s Philosophy as a Rigorous Science – The empirical subject psychologists investigate is closely related to the pure subject phenomenologists work on. Because of this, one could think that phenomenological analysis embraces naturalistic presuppositions, even though Husserl decidedly rejected this idea and argued, on the contrary, in favor of epoché, of eidetic research and of the primacy of intentional consciousness. In the current research on consciousness we witness a conflict between the authors supporting an embodied view who think that neurosciences are or will be able to sufficiently explain psychical phenomena and phenomenologists who rely on Husserl’s concept of hyle and conceive a subjectivity sensitive, or a consciousness bound to sensory experience. On first case the search for scientific status leads through the sciences of complexity up to a mathematized psyche, on second case phenomenologists find support in the advancements of the neuroscience.