Searle's New Mystery, or, How not to Solve the Problem of Consciousness
Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia June 29, 2013 DOI: 10.4453/rifp.2013.0001 (opens in new tab) via DOAJ
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractJohn Searle claims to have solved the mind-brain problem, particularly regarding consciousness, through his theory of biological naturalism. This paper examines Searle's theory from its 1980s origins to his latest works. The analysis reveals that biological naturalism contains numerous theoretical difficulties and logical inconsistencies, disqualifying it as a valid explanation for consciousness and the mind-brain relationship. Rather than solving the problem of consciousness, Searle has instead created a new mystery around it.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Topics | Philosophy of mind |
| Keywords | Consciousness Biological naturalism Mind-body problem |
| Key finding | Argues that Searle's biological naturalism suffers from theoretical difficulties and logical inconsistencies that disqualify it as a sound explanation for consciousness and the mind-brain problem. |
Abstract
John Searle repeatedly claims to have offered a solution to the mind-brain problem, especially as regards the mystery of consciousness. The aim of this paper is to present and analyse Searle’s theory of biological naturalism, from its earliest expression in the 1980s to his most recent works. Our analysis shows that Searle’s biological naturalism suffers from many theoretical difficulties and logical inconsistencies, which disqualify it as a sound explanation for consciousness and the mind-brain problem. We conclude that, far from offering a solution to the problem of consciousness, Searle ended up creating a new mystery of consciousness.