Searle's New Mystery, or, How not to Solve the Problem of Consciousness
Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia June 29, 2013 DOI: 10.4453/rifp.2013.0001 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Topics | Philosophy of mind |
| Keywords | Consciousness Biological naturalism Mind-body problem |
| Key points | Argues that Searle's biological naturalism suffers from theoretical difficulties and logical inconsistencies that disqualify it as a sound explanation for consciousness and the mind-brain problem. |
Abstract
John Searle repeatedly claims to have offered a solution to the mind-brain problem, especially as regards the mystery of consciousness. The aim of this paper is to present and analyse Searle’s theory of biological naturalism, from its earliest expression in the 1980s to his most recent works. Our analysis shows that Searle’s biological naturalism suffers from many theoretical difficulties and logical inconsistencies, which disqualify it as a sound explanation for consciousness and the mind-brain problem. We conclude that, far from offering a solution to the problem of consciousness, Searle ended up creating a new mystery of consciousness.