Self-experience in Dementia
Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia September 11, 2015 DOI: 10.4453/rifp.2015.0038 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Narrative self Episodic self Minimal self Dementia Self-disturbances Phenomenological psychopathology |
| Citations | 13 |
| Key points | Argues that in dementia, basic levels of self-experience, including an episodic sense of self, are preserved until the final stages of the illness. |
Abstract
This paper develops a phenomenological analysis of the disturbances of self-experience in dementia. After considering the lack of conceptual clarity regarding the notions of self and person in current research on dementia, we develop a phenomenological theory of the structure of self-experience in the first section. Within this complex structure, we distinguish between the basic level of pre-reflective self-awareness, the episodic sense of self, and the narrative constitution of the self. In the second section, we focus on dementia and argue that, despite the impairment of narrative self-understanding, more basic moments of self-experience are preserved. In accordance with the theory developed in the first part, we argue that, at least until the final stages of the illness, these self-experience in dementia goes beyond the pure minimal self, and rather entail forms of self-reference and an episodic sense of self.