Panpsychism, Emergentism and the Metaphysics of Causation
Pat Lewtas
Pacific philosophical quarterly September 1, 2018 DOI: 10.1111/papq.12167 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that panpsychism and emergentism are far less compatible than most philosophers suppose: panpsychism's rationalism requires a "strong account" of causation, while emergentism entails a "weak account" incompatible with any strong account. The author proposes that the two views belong to two wide-ranging but incompatible metaphysical packages. |
Abstract
Abstract: This article uses causation to show that panpsychism and emergentism share far less than most philosophers suppose. It argues that panpsychism has features, among them its rationalism, that force what the article calls a strong account of causation. And that emergentism entails what the article calls a weak account of causation incompatible with any strong account. The article then ventures that panpsychism and emergentism form parts of two wide‐ranging but incompatible metaphysical packages.