Searching for Revelation
Connor Quinn
Pacific philosophical quarterly September 28, 2026 DOI: 10.1111/papq.70025 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that recent essence-based and epistemic formulations of Revelation are unsatisfactory for defending antiphysicalism about consciousness. Proposes a revised version of Revelation that meets specified desiderata: conscious subjects are in a position to know that consciousness is fundamental. |
Abstract
ABSTRACT Some philosophers advance revelation theses in defense of antiphysicalism about consciousness. I argue that recent formulations of Revelation, including both essence‐based and epistemic formulations, are not satisfactory for the purposes to which these philosophers have put them. First, I clarify the motivations behind the search for Revelation and introduce some desiderata any such thesis would do well to meet. Then, I explain why recent attempts to formulate Revelation badly miss the mark. Finally, I suggest a version of Revelation that satisfies the desiderata: conscious subjects are in a position to know that consciousness is fundamental.