The Realization of Qualia, Persons, and Artifacts
Ben White
Pacific philosophical quarterly April 1, 2018 DOI: 10.1111/papq.12217 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that causal and functionalist definitions of realization fail for entities not individuated causally or functionally, and proposes amending them to require realizers to logically suffice for historical properties. Contends that if qualia resist causal or functional individuation, their physical realization requires that the thesis that all things are physical or physically realized is insufficient for physicalism. |
Abstract
Abstract: This article argues that standard causal and functionalist definitions of realization fail to account for the realization of entities that cannot be individuated in causal or functional terms. By modifying such definitions to require that realizers also logically suffice for any historical properties of the entities they realize, one can provide for the realization of entities whose resistance to causal/functional individuation stems from their possession of individuative historical properties. But if qualia cannot be causally or functionally individuated, then qualia can be physically realized only if the thesis that all things are physical or physically realized is insufficient for physicalism.