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Consciousness and Cognition

ISSN 1090-2376, 1053-8100

494 papers in the library · 4,347 citations · publishing 1995-2026

Papers

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The threat simulation theory of the evolutionary function of dreaming: Evidence from dreams of traumatized children.

Consciousness and Cognition March 1, 2005 Katja Valli, Antti Revonsuo, Outi Pälkäs et al.

The threat simulation theory of dreaming (TST) () states that dream consciousness is essentially an ancient biological defence mechanism, evolutionarily selected for its capacity to repeatedly simulate threatening events. Threat simulation during dreaming rehearses the cognitive mechanisms required for efficient threat perception and threat avoidance, leading to increased probability of...

Evolutionary pressures and a stable world for animals and robots: a commentary on Merker.

Consciousness and Cognition March 2005 Stan Franklin

In his article on The Liabilities of Mobility, asserts that "Consciousness presents us with a stable arena for our actions-the world ..." and argues for this property as providing evolutionary pressure for the evolution of consciousness. In this commentary, I will explore the implications of Merker's ideas for consciousness in artificial agents as well as animals, and also meet some possible...

Subjective experience is probably not limited to humans: the evidence from neurobiology and behavior.

Consciousness and Cognition March 2005 Bernard J. Baars

In humans, conscious perception and cognition depends upon the thalamocortical (T-C) complex, which supports perception, explicit cognition, memory, language, planning, and strategic control. When parts of the T-C system are damaged or stimulated, corresponding effects are found on conscious contents and state, as assessed by reliable reports. In contrast, large regions like cerebellum and...

State-dependent thinking: a comparison of waking and dreaming thought.

Consciousness and Cognition December 15, 2004 David Kahn, J Allan Hobson

Thinking is known to be state dependent but a systematic study of how thinking in dreams differs from thinking while awake has not been done. The study consisted of analyzing the dream reports of 26 subjects who, in addition to providing dream reports also provided answers to questions about their thinking within the dream. Our hypothesis was that thinking in dreams is not monolithic but has...

Handedness and the fringe of consciousness: strong handers ruminate while mixed handers self-reflect.

Consciousness and Cognition December 2004 Christopher Lee Niebauer

Previous research found that mixed handers (i.e., those that are more ambidextrous) were more likely than strong handers to update their beliefs (Niebauer, Aselage, & Schutte, 2002). It was assumed that this was due to greater degrees of communication between the two cerebral hemispheres in mixed handers. Niebauer and Garvey (2004) made connections between this model of updating beliefs and...

Identifying neural correlates of consciousness: The state space approach

Consciousness and Cognition December 1, 2004

This article sketches an idealized strategy for the identification of neural correlates of consciousness. The proposed strategy is based on a state space approach originating from the analysis of dynamical systems. The article then focuses on one constituent of consciousness, phenomenal awareness. Several rudimentary requirements for the identification of neural correlates of phenomenal...

On time, memory and dynamic form.

Consciousness and Cognition December 2004 Stephen E Robbins

A common approach to explaining the perception of form is through the use of static features. The weakness of this approach points naturally to dynamic definitions of form. Considering dynamical form, however, leads inevitably to the need to explain how events are perceived as time-extended--a problem with primacy over that even of qualia. Optic flow models, energy models, models reliant on a...

Neurocognitive mechanisms underlying the experience of flow.

Consciousness and Cognition December 2004 Arne Dietrich

Recent theoretical and empirical work in cognitive science and neuroscience is brought into contact with the concept of the flow experience. After a brief exposition of brain function, the explicit-implicit distinction is applied to the effortless information processing that is so characteristic of the flow state. The explicit system is associated with the higher cognitive functions of the...

Dissociative style and individual differences in verbal working memory span.

Consciousness and Cognition December 2004 Michiel B De Ruiter, R Hans Phaf, Bernet M. Elzinga et al.

Dissociative style is mostly studied as a risk factor for dissociative pathology, but it may also reflect a fundamental characteristic of healthy information processing. Due to the close link between attention and working memory and the previous finding of enhanced attentional abilities with a high dissociative style, a positive relationship was also expected between dissociative style and...

Extending the global workspace theory to emotion: phenomenality without access.

Consciousness and Cognition September 1, 2004 Dennis J L G Schutter, Jack Van Honk

Recent accounts on the global workspace theory suggest that consciousness involves transient formations of functional connections in thalamo-cortico-cortical networks. The level of connectivity in these networks is argued to determine the state of consciousness. Emotions are suggested to play a role in shaping consciousness, but their involvement in the global workspace theory remains elusive....

Poor recall of eye-movement signals from Stage 2 compared to REM sleep: implications for models of dreaming.

Consciousness and Cognition September 2004 Russell Conduit, Sheila Gillard Crewther, Grahame Coleman

An ongoing assumption made by sleep researchers is that since dreams are more often recalled on awakening from rapid eye movement (REM) sleep, dreams must occur more often during this stage of sleep. An alternative hypothesis is that cognition occurs throughout sleep, but the recall of this mentation differs on awakening. When a dream is not reported on awakening, there is no method of...

Criteria for an effective theory of consciousness and some preliminary attempts.

Consciousness and Cognition June 1, 2004 L Andrew Coward, Ron Sun 20 citations

In the physical sciences a rigorous theory is a hierarchy of descriptions in which causal relationships between many general types of entity at a phenomenological level can be derived from causal relationships between smaller numbers of simpler entities at more detailed levels. The hierarchy of descriptions resembles the modular hierarchy created in electronic systems in order to be able to...

Consciousness, art, and the brain: lessons from Marcel Proust.

Consciousness and Cognition June 2004 Russell Epstein

In his novel Remembrance of Things Past, Marcel Proust argues that conventional descriptions of the phenomenology of consciousness are incomplete because they focus too much on the highly-salient sensory information that dominates each moment of awareness and ignore the network of associations that lies in the background. In this paper, I explicate Proust's theory of conscious experience and...

Psychological and physiological characteristics of a proposed object-referral/self-referral continuum of self-awareness.

Consciousness and Cognition June 2004 Frederick Travis, Alarik Arenander, David DuBois

This research extends and confirms recent brainwave findings that distinguished an individual's sense-of-self along an Object-referral/Self-referral Continuum of self-awareness. Subjects were interviewed and were given tests measuring inner/outer orientation, moral reasoning, anxiety, and personality. Scores on the psychological tests were factor analyzed. The first unrotated PCA component of...

Self-consciousness, self-agency, and schizophrenia.

Consciousness and Cognition December 2003 Tilo Kircher, Dirk T Leube

Empirical approaches on topics such as consciousness, self-awareness, or introspective perspective, need a conceptual framework so that the emerging, still unconnected findings can be integrated and put into perspective. We introduce a model of self-consciousness derived from phenomenology, philosophy, the cognitive, and neurosciences. We will then give an overview of research data on one...

Intentional action: conscious experience and neural prediction.

Consciousness and Cognition December 2003 Patrick Haggard, Sam Clark

Intentional action involves both a series of neural events in the motor areas of the brain, and also a distinctive conscious experience that "I" am the author of the action. This paper investigates some possible ways in which these neural and phenomenal events may be related. Recent models of motor prediction are relevant to the conscious experience of action as well as to its neural control....

Task unrelated thought: the role of distributed processing.

Consciousness and Cognition June 2003 Jonathan Smallwood, Marc Obonsawin, Derek Heim

Task unrelated thought (TUT) refers to thought directed away from the current situation; for example, a day dream. Encapsulated models of cognition propose that qualitative changes in consciousness, i.e., the production of TUT, can be explained in terms of changes in the quantity of resources deployed for task completion. In contrast, distributed models of cognition emphasize the importance of...

Functional neuroanatomy of altered states of consciousness: The transient hypofrontality hypothesis

Consciousness and Cognition May 19, 2003 Arne Dietrich 486 citations

It is the central hypothesis of this paper that the mental states commonly referred to as altered states of consciousness are principally due to transient prefrontal cortex deregulation. Supportive evidence from psychological and neuroscientific studies of dreaming, endurance running, meditation, daydreaming, hypnosis, and various drug-induced states is presented and integrated. It is proposed...

DOI: 10.1016/s1053-8100(02)00046-6 (opens in new tab) Meditation Consciousness Cognitive psychology Cognition +2

Developmental aspects of consciousness: how much theory of mind do you need to be consciously aware?

Consciousness and Cognition March 1, 2003 Josef Perner, Zoltan Dienes

When do children become consciously aware of events in the world? Five possible strategies are considered for their usefulness in determining the age in question. Three of these strategies ask when children show signs of engaging in activities for which conscious awareness seems necessary in adults (verbal communication, executive control, explicit memory), and two of the strategies consider...

How many kinds of consciousness?

Consciousness and Cognition December 1, 2002 David Rosenthal 118 citations

Ned Block's influential distinction between phenomenal and access consciousness has become a staple of current discussions of consciousness. It is not often noted, however, that his distinction tacitly embodies unargued theoretical assumptions that favor some theoretical treatments at the expense of others. This is equally so for his less widely discussed distinction between phenomenal...

Emotional introspection.

Consciousness and Cognition December 2002 William Seager

One of the most vivid aspects of consciousness is the experience of emotion, yet this topic is given relatively little attention within consciousness studies. Emotions are crucial, for they provide quick and motivating assessments of value, without which action would be misdirected or absent. Emotions also involve linkages between phenomenal and intentional consciousness. This paper examines...

Physical, neural, and mental timing.

Consciousness and Cognition June 1, 2002 Wim Van de Grind

The conclusions drawn by Benjamin Libet from his work with colleagues on the timing of somatosensorial conscious experiences has met with a lot of praise and criticism. In this issue we find three examples of the latter. Here I attempt to place the divide between the two opponent camps in a broader perspective by analyzing the question of the relation between physical timing, neural timing, and...

I, zombie.

Consciousness and Cognition March 1, 2002 Paul Skokowski

Certain recent philosophical theories offer the prospect that zombies are possible. These theories argue that experiential contents, or qualia, are nonphysical properties. The arguments are based on the conceivability of alternate worlds in which physical laws and properties remain the same, but in which qualia either differ or are absent altogether. This article maintains that qualia are, on...