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Emotional introspection.

William Seager

Consciousness and Cognition December 2002 DOI: 10.1016/s1053-8100(02)00027-2 (opens in new tab)

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AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Key points Argues that emotional consciousness, viewed through the representational theory of consciousness, requires a distinctive representation of value, and that extending the theory's account of introspection to emotions explains why emotional states are often introspected despite introspection not being needed to experience them, and why such introspection is less reliable than introspection of other conscious states.

Abstract

One of the most vivid aspects of consciousness is the experience of emotion, yet this topic is given relatively little attention within consciousness studies. Emotions are crucial, for they provide quick and motivating assessments of value, without which action would be misdirected or absent. Emotions also involve linkages between phenomenal and intentional consciousness. This paper examines emotional consciousness from the standpoint of the representational theory of consciousness (RTC). Two interesting developments spring from this. The first is the need for the representation of value, which is distinctive of emotional experience. The second is an extension of RTC's theory of introspection to emotional states, revealing why emotional consciousness is so often introspective even though introspective abilities are not needed to experience emotions, and also explaining why introspection of emotional states is so much less reliable than that of other states of consciousness.

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