On time, memory and dynamic form.
Stephen E Robbins
Consciousness and Cognition December 2004 DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2004.07.006 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that static-feature explanations of form perception are insufficient and that dynamic accounts require explaining how events are perceived as time-extended, a problem the author treats as more fundamental than qualia. Examines optic flow, energy, and rigidity-constraint models, contending that their reliance on instantaneous specification of form forces consideration of a primary memory underlying both time-extended event perception and the time-extension of consciousness, which cannot be reduced to spatial-temporal integration. Suggests psychology may need to follow physics in a more profound approach to time and motion. |
Abstract
A common approach to explaining the perception of form is through the use of static features. The weakness of this approach points naturally to dynamic definitions of form. Considering dynamical form, however, leads inevitably to the need to explain how events are perceived as time-extended--a problem with primacy over that even of qualia. Optic flow models, energy models, models reliant on a rigidity constraint are examined. The reliance of these models on the instantaneous specification of form at an instant, t, or across a series of such instants forces the consideration of the primary memory supporting both the perception of time-extended events and the time-extension of consciousness. This cannot be reduced to an integration over space and time. The difficulty of defining the basis for this memory is highlighted in considerations of dynamic form in relation to scales of time. Ultimately, the possibility is raised that psychology must follow physics in a more profound approach to time and motion.