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The Problem of Consciousness

David Papineau

The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness July 9, 2020 DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198749677.013.1 (opens in new tab)

Summary

AI-generated from the abstract

Consciousness raises philosophical questions about its relation to reality, its location, and its nature. The chapter focuses on how consciousness relates to other features of reality, a central question in recent philosophy. The difficulty arises from an alleged explanatory gap between consciousness and physical processes. The chapter examines the source of this gap and its philosophical implications.

Study at a glance

Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Citations 16
Key finding Argues that the explanatory gap between consciousness and physical processes is the central difficulty for understanding how consciousness relates to reality, and that correctly conceiving its source has important philosophical implications.

Abstract

Consciousness raises a range of philosophical questions. We can distinguish between the How?, Where?, and What? questions. First, how does consciousness relate to other features of reality? Second, where are conscious phenomena located in reality? And, third, what is the nature of consciousness? In line with much philosophical writing over the past fifty years, this chapter will focus mostly on the How? question. What makes the question difficult is the existence of an alleged explanatory gap between consciousness and physical processes. This chapter is devoted to the source of this explanatory gap and to the philosophical implications of a correct conception of this source.

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