Skip to content

The Myth of When and Where: How False Assumptions Still Haunt Theories of Consciousness

Sepehrdad Rahimian

PsyArXiv August 28, 2021 preprint DOI: 10.31234/osf.io/crbt5 (opens in new tab)

Study at a glance

AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper
Key points Argues that commonly acknowledged theories of consciousness do not provide an account of subjective experience because they are built on false assumptions, and proposes Illusionism as the only option for a scientific investigation of consciousness, contending that even if panpsychism holds the missing piece, the path to it must go through Illusionism.

Abstract

Recent advances in Neural sciences have uncovered countless new facts about the brain. Although there is a plethora of theories of consciousness, it seems to some philosophers that there is still an explanatory gap when it comes to a scientific account of subjective experience. In what follows, I will argue why some of our more commonly acknowledged theories do not at all provide us with an account of subjective experience as they are built on false assumptions. These assumptions have led us into a state of cognitive dissonance between maintaining our standard scientific practices on one hand, and maintaining our folk notions on the other. I will then end by proposing Illusionism as the only option for a scientific investigation of consciousness and that even if ideas like panpsychism turn out to be holding the seemingly missing piece of the puzzle, the path to them must go through Illusionism.

Citations in the library