Fizykalistyczny panpsychizm (przeł. Jacek Jarocki)
Roczniki Filozoficzne 2018 DOI: 10.18290/rf.2018.66.1-11 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 2 |
| Key points | Argues that panpsychism is the best metaphysical account of the nature of the ultimate stuff of reality, and proposes a physicalist version in which experience (experientiality) is the fundamental stuff of all concrete objects. |
Abstract
Rougly speaking, panpsychism is the view, that everything is mind or have consciousness. Although the view has a long and venerable tradition, and becomes more and more popular in the contemporary debate, it still has many opponents. The aim of this article is to prove that panpsychism is the best metaphysical account of the nature of the ultimate stuff of reality. At the same time, it is a kind of physicalism, according to which experience (experientiality) is the fundamental stuff of all concrete objects. Galen Strawson, „Physicalist Panpsychism”, in: The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness . Second Edition , ed. Susan Schneider i Max Velmans (Oxford: Wiley Blackwell, 2017), 374–390. Information about Translator: Jacek Jarocki, MA—PhD student, Department of the History of Modern and Contemporary Philosophy, Faculty of Philosophy at the John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin; address for correspondence: Al. Raclawickie 14, PL 20–950 Lublin; e‑mail: jacekjarocki@kul.pl