The Mark of the Cognitive and the Coupling-Constitution Fallacy: A Defense of the Extended Mind Hypothesis.
Frontiers in Psychology January 1, 2017 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2017.02061 (opens in new tab) via PubMed
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractThe extended mind hypothesis holds that some mental states can be realized by non-biological external resources. Two main criticisms—the coupling-constitution fallacy and the alleged lack of a mark of the cognitive—have been raised against this view. This paper argues that neither criticism is effective. The mark of the cognitive proposed by critics does not secure the position that cognition is always intracranial, and the coupling-constitution fallacy attacks extended cognition on the very point the theory was designed to defend: that coupling relations between agents and environmental resources are the best way to individuate cognitive systems.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Coupling-constitution fallacy Extended mind Functionalism Methodological individualism |
| Key finding | Argues that the coupling-constitution fallacy and the mark of the cognitive proposed by Adams and Aizawa do not effectively refute the extended cognition thesis. |
Abstract
Clark and Chalmers (1998) introduced the extended mind hypothesis, according to which some mental states can be realized by non-biological external resources. A lively debate has flourished around this hypothesis, connected with the issues of embodiment, embeddedness, situatedness and enaction (cf. Clark, 2008; Menary, 2010; Shapiro, 2011). Two of the main criticisms addressed to the functionalist version of the extended mind thesis have been the so-called "coupling-constitution fallacy" and the alleged lack of a mark of the cognitive (Adams and Aizawa, 2001, 2005, 2009, 2010a,b). According to Adams and Aizawa, extended cognition is a logical possibility, but is not instantiated in our world. Following this view, they defend a "contingent intracranialism," based on a specific mark of the cognitive that they propose. In this paper I intend to show that neither criticism is effective against the extended cognition thesis. In particular: the mark of the cognitive proposed by Adams and Aizawa does not secure contingent intracranialism;the coupling-constitution fallacy criticizes extended cognition on precisely the point the theory was intended to defend: namely, that the best way to individuate cognitive systems, given a minimal mark of the cognitive, is to rely on coupling relations between agents and environmental resources.