To bee or not to bee?
Shimon Edelman, Roy Moyal, Tomer Fekete
Animal Sentience August 19, 2016 DOI: 10.51291/2377-7478.1148 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Commentary Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Consciousness Section typography Anthropocentrism Argument complex analysis Epistemology Cognitive science Environmental ethics |
| Citations | 16 |
| Key points | Argues that Klein & Barron's case for insect consciousness can be strengthened by incorporating computational theory and by clarifying distinctions between awareness and its contents, awareness and selfhood, and easy versus hard problems in consciousness research. |
Abstract
Klein & Barron’s (2016) (K & B’s) case for insect consciousness is a welcome development in an area that, in all of the science and philosophy of mind, is probably the most anthropocentric. In this commentary, we seek to strengthen K & B’s side of the argument by appealing not just to putative neural mechanisms but also to computational theory that supports it (section 1). We also offer some remarks on three distinctions that are relevant to K & B’s thesis and are central to phenomenal awareness: between the capacity for awareness and its contents (section 2); between awareness and selfhood (section 3); and between “easy” and “hard” problems in consciousness research (section 4).