To bee or not to bee?
Shimon Edelman, Roy Moyal, Tomer Fekete
Animal Sentience August 19, 2016 DOI: 10.51291/2377-7478.1148 (opens in new tab) via OpenAlex
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractA commentary on Klein & Barron's argument for insect consciousness aims to strengthen their case by appealing to computational theory in addition to neural mechanisms. The authors discuss three distinctions relevant to phenomenal awareness: the capacity for awareness versus its contents, awareness versus selfhood, and the distinction between easy and hard problems in consciousness research. The commentary supports the view that insects may possess a form of consciousness, challenging anthropocentric assumptions in the science and philosophy of mind.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Commentary Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Consciousness Section typography Anthropocentrism Argument complex analysis Epistemology |
| Citations | 16 |
| Key finding | Argues that Klein & Barron's case for insect consciousness can be strengthened by incorporating computational theory and by clarifying distinctions between awareness and its contents, awareness and selfhood, and easy versus hard problems in consciousness research. |
Abstract
Klein & Barron’s (2016) (K & B’s) case for insect consciousness is a welcome development in an area that, in all of the science and philosophy of mind, is probably the most anthropocentric. In this commentary, we seek to strengthen K & B’s side of the argument by appealing not just to putative neural mechanisms but also to computational theory that supports it (section 1). We also offer some remarks on three distinctions that are relevant to K & B’s thesis and are central to phenomenal awareness: between the capacity for awareness and its contents (section 2); between awareness and selfhood (section 3); and between “easy” and “hard” problems in consciousness research (section 4).