Consciousness without conflation
Anthony P. Atkinson, Martin Davies
Behavioral and Brain Sciences June 1, 1995 DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x00038206 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Commentary Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that information-processing theories cannot provide a full explanatory account of P-consciousness, but that cognitive psychology conflates P-consciousness and A-consciousness less than Block suspects, and that some reasoning Block criticizes can be plausibly interpreted via a folk psychological view of their relation. |
Abstract
AbstractAlthough information-processing theories cannot provide a full explanatory account of P-consciousness, there is less conflation and confusion in cognitive psychology than Block suspects. Some of the reasoning that Block criticises can be interpreted plausibly in the light of a folk psychological view of relation between P-consciousness and A-consciousness.
Citations in the library
Cites 5
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