Phenomenal access: A moving target
Behavioral and Brain Sciences June 1, 1995 DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x00038334 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that the distinction between phenomenal and access consciousness is better understood in relation to the explanatory gap, and proposes that some notion of access is essentially involved in phenomenal experience. |
Abstract
AbstractBasically agreeing with Block regarding the need for a distinction between P- and A-consciousness, I characterize the problem somewhat diflerently, relating it more directly to the explanatory gap. I also speculate on the relation between the two forms of consciousness, arguing that some notion of access is essentially involved in phenomenal experience.
Citations in the library
Cited by 4
- On a confusion about a function of consciousness Behavioral and Brain Sciences June 1, 1995
- On a confusion about there being two types of consciousness. Trends in Cognitive Sciences December 17, 2025
- Sidestepping the semantics of "consciousness". Behavioral and Brain Sciences April 1, 2004
- An example of access-consciousness without phenomenal consciousness? Behavioral and Brain Sciences March 1, 1997
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