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Philosophy of mind research published in 2026

Page 7 of 20: studies 121 to 140 of 385, newest first. Back to the philosophy of mind overview

Studies

Enacting Ontological Pluralism: Informational Dynamics and Embodied Cognition in Śaiva-Śākta Phenomenology

Philosophies July 14, 2026 Diego Gonzalez-Rodriguez

Contemporary cognitive science is predominantly grounded in physicalist assumptions that locate cognition and consciousness in neural and computational processes. While these approaches have yielded significant empirical advances, they often struggle to account for the qualitative and first-person structure of experience. This paper proposes an ethno-phenomenological perspective by engaging...

DOI: 10.3390/philosophies11040120 (opens in new tab) Philosophy of mind Embodied cognition Phenomenology philosophy Consciousness +15

Tensions and Opportunities: Accessing Embodied Experience in HCI through Micro-Phenomenology

Creativity & Cognition July 13, 2026 Xinglin Sun, Yulin Tian, Claudia Núñez-Pacheco et al.

Micro-phenomenology has recently gained traction in HCI as ways of accessing embodied, lived dimensions of interaction that resist conventional qualitative capture. By foregrounding pre-reflective experience, this approach promises greater experiential precision. However, when designers and HCI researchers attempt to apply Micro-phenomenology in practice, frictions often emerge. The method was...

The Hard Problem of Life Dissolved: A Similarity Theory Account

PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) July 13, 2026 Simon Raphaël

This paper examines the so-called hard problem of life: how supposedly non-conscious matter could become a living, self-organising and experientially unified being. Similarity Theory argues that the problem arises from the materialist assumption that consciousness must emerge from matter. Within the Similarity Theory framework, consciousness is ontologically primary, matter is a structured...

Emotions as natural kinds: An internalist-causalist account

Philosophy and the Mind Sciences July 13, 2026 Ali Yousefi Heris

Are emotions natural kinds? The debate is often framed as a choice between biologically fixed kinds with invariant essences and culturally constructed categories lacking natural reality. I argue that this framing is too restrictive because it conflates two independent questions: what fixes the content of emotion concepts, and what unifies natural kinds. Cross-classifying externalist and...

DOI: 10.33735/phimisci.2026.12376 (opens in new tab) Philosophy of mind Natural archaeology Metaphysics Internalism and externalism +13

Consciousness Multiplied

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research July 13, 2026 James H. McIntyre

ABSTRACT It is generally assumed that an ordinary human brain is associated with a single mind. Indeed, this assumption is so deeply rooted that it is rarely articulated explicitly, let alone questioned. However, as philosophers of mind have increasingly noticed, it turns out to rest on alarmingly shaky ground. In this article, I argue for the multiplicity hypothesis : under normal conditions,...

DOI: 10.1111/phpr.70146 (opens in new tab) Philosophy of mind Consciousness Argument complex analysis Rest music +5

Longitudinal dream-content shift and void-like dissociative phenomenology around outpatient ketamine infusions in chronic low back pain: a case report.

Journal of Medical Case Reports July 13, 2026 Kei Torii, Ryo Nishitani

Altered-state phenomenology around ketamine may relate to longer-term changes in imaginal processes, but observations across routine care are scarce. We report an educational case focusing on pre-defined dream motifs over time, without making treatment efficacy claims. A 48-year-old Japanese man with severe chronic primary low back pain reported dreams during insight-oriented psychotherapy from...

What Actually is the ‘Hard Problem’ of Consciousness? Native Quantum Cosmovisions as Response to Our Polycrisis

Philosophy International Journal July 10, 2026 JW Kremer

One of the challenges our current polycrisis presents is to comprehend the role of our understanding of consciousness in the genesis of this host of intertwined crises. Instead of focusing on the so-called hard problem of how experience and subjectivity arise from matter, the suggestion is that the actual hard problem is how our minds and bodies lost their sensual, nurturing embeddedness in the...

Monadic panmentalism, the hard problem of consciousness, and the ingredient problem

Synthese July 10, 2026 Savvas Ioannou

Abstract The hard problem of consciousness, introduced by Chalmers (1995, 2017), reveals that merely dispositional and relational physical properties cannot ground phenomenal properties. Panpsychism attempts to address this problem by positing that micro-objects possess phenomenal properties that ground our phenomenal properties. However, Nagasawa (2021) has argued that panpsychism faces the...

DOI: 10.1007/s11229-026-05697-5 (opens in new tab) Full text (opens in new tab) Philosophy of mind Metaphysics Philosophy of language Philosophy of science +5

[Abnormal (disturbed) self-experiences in schizophrenia spectrum disorders: the qualitative aspect].

Vertex Revista Argentina de Psiquiatría July 10, 2026 Marco Fierro, Abel Guerrero, Juan Toro

Over the past 30 years, psychopathology has shown a growing interest in the study of the self and its alterations from a phenomenological perspective, and a number of studies have appeared on the anomalous experience in schizophrenia. Publications on these topics are scarce in Spanish-language psychiatry. For this reason, this article presents a narrative review, first, of the concept of the...

DOI: 10.53680/vertex.v37i172.1018 (opens in new tab) Full text (opens in new tab) Phenomenology Self-disorders Anomalous self-experiences Schizophrenia prodrome

The Limits of Reflective Inquiry, the Philosophy of Mind, and Kant (Reflections on a Book)

Voprosy Filosofii July 10, 2026 Viktor D. Bakulov, Danil R. Melnikov

The article offers a reflection on the collective monograph “Kant and the Philosophy of Mind” and analyzes the current state of analytic philosophy of consciousness through the lens of Kant’s critical project. It examines which aspects of Kantian thought are most fruitful for understanding phenomenal consciousness and the limits of inquiry. The central question concerns which feature of...

DOI: 10.21146/0042-8744-2026-7-155-165 (opens in new tab) Consciousness Articulation sociology Metaphysics Philosophy of science +6

The Intercorporeal Present: Toward a Neurophenomenology of Shared Minimal-Dual Awareness

Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) July 10, 2026 Tenzin Trepp preprint

We argue that a distinctive form of intersubjective experience – shared minimal-dual awareness (MDA) or “intercorporeal present” – can be jointly enacted by individuals. In this mode, two embodied persons co-engage in a present-centered attentional field such that each person’s habitual self-narrative falls silent, while a mutual salience‐space forms between them, yet without erasing their...

Intentional Horizons and Phenomenology

A Sense of the Possible July 9, 2026 Jonathan Mitchell

Abstract This chapter provides the reader with two things that are helpful in orientating them for what is to come across the study. In the first instance it provides a substantive reconstruction of the notion of an intentional horizon. Secondly, it offers theoretical background, motivation, and defence for the approach to the study of perceptual experience that is taken in the book, namely one...

The Epistemological Crisis of Rationality in the Age of Artificial Intelligence Through the Lens of 4E Cognition and Postphenomenology

Philosophies July 8, 2026 O. Varypaiev

Everyday work with large language models (LLMs) normalizes a practice in which a generated formulation supports judgment before the user has checked its grounds. This crisis of rationality arises not from a single technical defect in the system, but from a shift in justificatory practice in which fluent textual coherence is read as evidence of semantic understanding and rational judgment. The...

The Hard Problem of Projected Presence Reframing Consciousness Through Organismic Stabilization

Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) July 8, 2026 Karel Hrubec preprint

This conceptual paper proposes a methodological reframing of the hard problem of consciousness through the notion of projected presence. Building on the Projected Stabilization Thesis, it argues that first-person immediacy should not be granted automatic foundational authority. Consciousness is not treated as an inner observer, a private theater, or an illusion, but as the biologically...

DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.21264986 (opens in new tab) Philosophy of mind Cognitive reframing Consciousness Immediacy +15

Infants, the marker method, and the nature of consciousness

Philosophy and the Mind Sciences July 6, 2026 Jacob Berger, Lori M. Curtindale

A new method for determining whether nonverbal organisms such as human infants have consciousness has recently emerged. According to this so-called marker methodology, we do not use theories of consciousness to assess whether creatures are conscious by meeting the conditions set out by those theories. Rather, we identify a range of markers that putatively correlate with consciousness to make...

Theories of Consciousness: Constraints, Commitments, and Complementarity

Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) July 3, 2026 Bruno Tonetto preprint

Abstract: The apparent conflict between consciousness science and consciousness-first metaphysics is largely an artifact of ontological packaging rather than of the empirical findings themselves. Contemporary theories of consciousness — IIT, Global Workspace, predictive processing, Higher-Order Theories, Recurrent Processing, Attention Schema Theory, Orch OR, and others — each package a...

The Shape Of Reality: Cognitive Languages and the Phenomenology of Psychosis

Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) July 3, 2026 Amalie Stepperud-Antonsen preprint

This hypothesis paper proposes that psychosis preserves an individuals native cognitive architecture while disrupting reality attribution. Building on predictive processing, dreaming, and the Cognitive Languages framework, it suggests that the phenomenology of psychotic experience reflects the brain's pre-existing representational systems rather than a completely new mode of cognition. The...

DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.21160451 (opens in new tab) Phenomenology philosophy Falsifiability Cognition Psychosis +5

F. H. Bradley's Concept of Immediate Experience: An Evaluation in terms of Debates on Phenomenal Consciousness

Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) July 2, 2026 Betül Yıldız preprint

The aim of this study is to examine the concept of "immediate experience" in the philosophy of F. H. Bradley, one of the prominent figures of British Idealism, and to re-evaluate the philosophical problems it generates within the context of contemporary philosophy of mind. According to Bradley, immediate experience is a primary, non-relational unity that precedes thought, judgment, and the...

The Architecture of Existential Health: Toward a phenomenology of meaning, mortality and human flourishing

Existential Analysis: Journal of the Society for Existential Analysis July 1, 2026 Jim Palmer

Contemporary models of well-being remain incomplete because they overlook the existential dimension. Drawing on philosophy, phenomenology, anthropology, sociology and public health, this article proposes existential health as a fourth domain of human flourishing. It examines how individuals and societies relate to mortality, groundlessness, isolation, meaning, belonging and ecological...