F. H. Bradley's Concept of Immediate Experience: An Evaluation in terms of Debates on Phenomenal Consciousness
Betül Yıldız
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) July 2, 2026 preprint DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.21133094 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Topics | Philosophy of mind |
| Keywords | Consciousness Dilemma Immediacy Metaphysics Context archaeology Interpretation philosophy Power physics Epistemology Cognition Analytic philosophy Contemporary philosophy Subject documents |
| Key points | Argues that F. H. Bradley's concept of immediate experience and its paradox of reflection share a meaningful structural tension with contemporary debates on phenomenal consciousness, qualia, and non-conceptual content. |
Abstract
The aim of this study is to examine the concept of "immediate experience" in the philosophy of F. H. Bradley, one of the prominent figures of British Idealism, and to re-evaluate the philosophical problems it generates within the context of contemporary philosophy of mind. According to Bradley, immediate experience is a primary, non-relational unity that precedes thought, judgment, and the subject-object dichotomy. However, attempts to bring this experience into conceptual and philosophical discourse objectify it, thereby altering its pristine immediacy and generating a "paradox of reflection." This paper argues that, contrary to Bradley’s historical marginalization by the analytic tradition, his methodological dilemma shares a common ground and a meaningful structural tension with contemporary debates on phenomenal consciousness (Ned Block), qualia, Thomas Nagel’s "what is it like to be" question, and non-conceptual content theories (Gareth Evans, Christopher Peacocke). While the study addresses the difficulties inherent in Bradley’s idealist metaphysical commitments and the problem of "ineffability," it ultimately concludes that his approach to immediate experience remains a provocative conceptual resource for current consciousness studies due to its power to problematisze deeply-entrenched epistemic and cognitive assumptions.
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