Developments in Illusionism about Consciousness
Taiga Shinozaki
Kagaku tetsugaku November 8, 2024 DOI: 10.4216/jpssj.57.1_57 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that illusionism, the view that phenomenal consciousness does not exist but merely seems to, offers a way past the apparent stalemate in reductionist approaches to consciousness. The author contends it could liberate consciousness research from metaphysical preoccupations by debunking the hard problem as a pseudo problem and reframing the task as the illusion problem: explaining why we believe phenomenal consciousness exists even though it does not. |
Abstract
Illusionism about phenomenal consciousness is the view that claims that phenomenal consciousness does not exist, but merely seems to exist. As the reductionist approach to consciousness has seemed stuck, panpsychism and illusionism have raised as the alternatives. Recently, illusionism has attracted those who hesitate to hold panpsychism. Illusionism may liberate study of consciousness from the metaphysical preoccupations by debunking the hard problem of consciousness as a pseudo problem. Instead, illusionists suggests that what we should address is the illusion problem: why do we believe that phenomenal consciousness exists, even though it does not?
Citations in the library
Cites 10
- Realistic Monism: Why Physicalism Entails Panpsychism Oxford University Press eBooks May 29, 2008
- Phenomenal Consciousness Cambridge University Press eBooks September 28, 2000
- Can you believe it? Illusionism and the illusion meta-problem Philosophical Psychology October 25, 2017
- Quining diet qualia. Consciousness and Cognition June 1, 2012
- Does illusionism imply skepticism of animal consciousness? Synthese May 27, 2022
and 5 more in the library