Consciousness beyond the comparator
Victor A. Shames, Timothy L. Hubbard
Behavioral and Brain Sciences December 1, 1995 DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x00040620 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Commentary Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 2 |
| Key points | Argues that Gray's comparator model does not adequately explain consciousness because it defines consciousness too narrowly, excluding basic phenomenology and active functions, and because match/mismatch decisions can occur without any experience of consciousness, so the model fails the sufficiency criterion. |
Abstract
Abstract Gray's comparator model fails to provide an adequate explanation of consciousness for two reasons. First, it is based on a narrow definition of consciousness that excludes basic phenomenology and active functions of consciousness. Second, match/mismatch decisions can be made without producing an experience of consciousness. The model thus violates the sufficiency criterion.
Citations in the library
Cites 12
- Consciousness in Contemporary Science Oxford University Press eBooks March 12, 1992
- The Disorder of Consciousness in Schizophrenia Schizophrenia Bulletin 1987
- Advances in Consciousness Research Advances in Consciousness Research December 16, 2013
- Consciousness, dreams and virtual realities Philosophical Psychology 1995
- Consciousness and Brain Archives of General Psychiatry August 1, 1973
and 7 more in the library