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Don't leave the “un” off “consciousness”

Neal R. Swerdlow

Behavioral and Brain Sciences December 1, 1995 DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x00040656 (opens in new tab)

Study at a glance

AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Commentary Peer reviewed
Key points Argues that Gray's extrapolation from circuit models of psychopathology to neural substrates of consciousness faces three limitations: incomplete knowledge of synaptic arrangements, the need for replication of latent inhibition deficits in schizophrenia, and the omission of any neuropsychological account of the unconscious.

Abstract

AbstractGray extrapolates from circuit models of psychopathology to propose neural substrates for the contents of consciousness. I raise three concerns: (1) knowledge of synaptic arrangements may be inadequate to fully support his model; (2) latent inhibition deficits in schizophrenia, a focus of this and related models, are complex and deserve replication; and (3) this conjecture omits discussion of the neuropsychological basis for the contents of the unconscious.