Machine Consciousness Under Functionalist Uncertainty: From Generic Objections to Discriminating Tests

Abstract

Discussions of machine consciousness often start with broad intuitions about biology, simulation, training, or behavior. This paper instead uses a candidate functionalist model as a stress test. On that model, a consciousness-relevant state would involve relationally structured content, contextual integration, action-guiding valuation or priority, and global availability. The argument is conditional: we ask what would follow if a functionalist identity thesis of this general kind remains a live possibility, without assuming that these four roles are sufficient for phenomenal consciousness. The main distinction is between generic objections and objections that identify a specific mechanism or architectural requirement. Non-biological substrate, simulation, and training history do not by themselves justify near-categorical denial. Embodiment and precariousness, recurrent processing, and global-workspace organization provide stronger reasons for skepticism about current systems. We then turn these disagreements into theory-indexed empirical tests. The resulting position is deliberately asymmetric: current systems may rationally receive a low probability of consciousness without that warranting either categorical denial or confident affirmation. We do not claim that any current system is conscious.