Consciousness and its (dis)contents
Behavioral and Brain Sciences December 1, 1995 DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x00040693 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that no transparent causal account yet links consciousness to brain and behaviour, and defends the proposal that the contents of consciousness consist psychologically of the outputs of a comparator system, with a widened account of its proposed neural machinery and a clarified relationship between present contents of consciousness and episodic memory. |
Abstract
AbstractThe first claim in the target article was that there is as yet no transparent, causal account of the relations between consciousness and brain-and-behaviour. That claim remains firm. The second claim was that the contents of consciousness consist, psychologically, of the outputs of a comparator system; the third consisted of a description of the brain mechanisms proposed to instantiate the comparator. In order to defend these claims against criticism, it has been necessary to clarify the distinction between consciousness-as-such and the contents of consciousness, to widen the description of the neural machinery instantiating the comparator system, and to clarify the relationship between the contents of consciousness in the here-and-now and episodic memory.