Consciousness and Brain
Archives of General Psychiatry August 1, 1973 DOI: 10.1001/archpsyc.1973.04200020005001 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 55 |
| Key points | Argues that objections to Feigl's psychoneural identity thesis can be countered by identifying consciousness with "pure events" that are neurally embodied for an observer, subdividing consciousness into phenomenal contents (representation events coding input) and conscious context (processing events comprising intrinsic organizations), with the "phenomenal I" identified with processing events on the nervous system's output side. |
Abstract
An understanding of the relationship of consciousness to brain is integral to the development of a general theory for psychiatry. It is argued that objections to Feigl's psychoneural identity thesis can be countered by considering consciousness as identical with "pure events" which, to an observer, are neurally embodied. Consciousness may be subdivided into phenomenal contents and the conscious context (consciousness per se) which are respectively identical with representation events that code input to the brain and processing events which do not code input but comprise intrinsic organizations. The "phenomenal I", the so-called "ghost in the machine," is held to be identical with processing events on the output side of the nervous system.
Citations in the library
Cited by 15
- The elusive quale Behavioral and Brain Sciences December 1, 1995
- Perspective, reflection, transparent explanation, and other minds Behavioral and Brain Sciences December 1, 1995
- Implications of a Fundamental Consciousness Activitas Nervosa Superior June 1, 2010
- Don't leave the “un” off “consciousness” Behavioral and Brain Sciences December 1, 1995
- On seeking the mythical fountain of consciousness Behavioral and Brain Sciences December 1, 1995
and 10 more in the library