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Consciousness and the varieties of emotion experience: a theoretical framework.

J. Lambie, A. Marcel

Psychology Review April 1, 2002 DOI: 10.1037/0033-295x.109.2.219 (opens in new tab)

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AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Key points Argues that prior theories of emotion experience are too narrow because emotion experience is heterogeneous, and proposes that it depends on three aspects of attention: mode (analytic-synthetic; detached-immersed), direction (self-world), and focus (evaluation-action). Drawing on a two-level view distinguishing first-order phenomenology from second-order awareness, the authors use these distinctions to account for cases of "unconscious" emotion in which phenomenology or awareness appears absent.

Abstract

Data reviewed suggest that previous theories of emotion experience are too narrow in scope and that lack of consensus is due to the fact that emotion experience takes various forms and is heterogenous. The authors treat separately the content of emotion experience, the underlying nonconscious correspondences, and processes producing emotion experience. They classify the nature and content of emotion experience and propose that it depends on 3 aspects of attention: mode (analytic-synthetic; detached-immersed), direction (self-world), and focus (evaluation-action). The account is informed by a 2-level view of consciousness in which phenomenology (1st order) is distinguished from awareness (2nd order). These distinctions enable the authors to differentiate and account for cases of "unconscious" emotion, in which there is an apparent lack of phenomenology or awareness.

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