Peter Carruthers has recently argued for a surprising conditional: if a global workspace theory of phenomenal consciousness is both correct and fully reductive, then there are no substantive facts to discover about phenomenal consciousness in nonhuman animals. I present two problems for this conditional. First, it rests on an odd double-standard about the ordinary concept of phenomenal...
I argue that an older debate in phenomenology concerning Husserl’s notion of hyletic data can throw some light on contemporary debates about qualia and phenomenal consciousness. Both debates tend to ignore important considerations about bodily experience and how specific kinds of bodily experience can shape one’s consciousness of the world. A revised and fully embodied conception of hyletic...
Despite such widespread acclaim, there are some influential theater critics who have panned Qualia ! most recently and vehemently, Dan Dennett. In his review, Quining Qualia,1 he laments several characters of Qualia ! as unrealistic and even kitschy. This literary criticism begets social criticism in Dennett's Consciousness Explained ,2 where he puts the blame for Qualia ! and similar...