ISSN 0276-2080
8 papers in the library · 47 citations · publishing 1994-2021
Philosophical Topics November 11, 2021 P. Carruthers
ABSTRACT:The best empirically grounded theory of first-personal phenomenal consciousness is global workspace theory. This, combined with the success of the phenomenal-concept strategy, means that consciousness can be fully reductively explained in terms of globally broadcast representational content. So there are no qualia (and there is no mental paint). As a result, the question of which other...
Philosophical Topics 2020 Heather Browning, Walter Veit
This paper addresses what we consider to be the most pressing challenge for the emerging science of consciousness: the measurement problem of consciousness. That is, by what methods can we determine the presence of and properties of consciousness? Most methods are currently developed through evaluation of the presence of consciousness in humans and here we argue that there are particular...
Philosophical Topics 2020 Patrick Butlin
Affective experience in nonhuman animals is of great interest for both theoretical and practical reasons. This paper highlights research by the psychologists Anthony Dickinson and Bernard Balleine which provides particularly good evidence of conscious affective experience in rats. This evidence is compelling because it implicates a sophisticated system for goal-directed action selection, and...
Philosophical Topics 2020 Kate Nicole Hoffman
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) is a mental health condition in which the experience of a traumatic event causes a series of psychiatric and behavioral symptoms such as hypervigilance, insomnia, irritability, aggression, constricted affect, and self-destructive behavior. This paper investigates two case studies to argue that the experience of PTSD is not restricted to humans alone; we...
Philosophical Topics 2020 Jonathan Birch
Peter Carruthers has recently argued for a surprising conditional: if a global workspace theory of phenomenal consciousness is both correct and fully reductive, then there are no substantive facts to discover about phenomenal consciousness in nonhuman animals. I present two problems for this conditional. First, it rests on an odd double-standard about the ordinary concept of phenomenal...
Philosophical Topics 2011 Robert Hanna 9 citations
Precisely how and precisely where is human conscious experience located in the natural world? The Extended Conscious Mind Thesis says this: The constitutive mechanisms of human conscious experience include both extra-neural bodily facts and also extra-bodily worldly facts. Recently, in “Spreading the Joy? Why the Machinery of Consciousness Is (Probably) Still in the Head,” Andy Clark has argued...
Philosophical Topics 2011 Shaun Gallagher 5 citations
I argue that an older debate in phenomenology concerning Husserl’s notion of hyletic data can throw some light on contemporary debates about qualia and phenomenal consciousness. Both debates tend to ignore important considerations about bodily experience and how specific kinds of bodily experience can shape one’s consciousness of the world. A revised and fully embodied conception of hyletic...
Philosophical Topics 1994 Eric Lormand 33 citations
Despite such widespread acclaim, there are some influential theater critics who have panned Qualia ! most recently and vehemently, Dan Dennett. In his review, Quining Qualia,1 he laments several characters of Qualia ! as unrealistic and even kitschy. This literary criticism begets social criticism in Dennett's Consciousness Explained ,2 where he puts the blame for Qualia ! and similar...