Phenomenal Externalism or If Meanings Ain't in the Head, Where Are Qualia?
Philosophical Issues 1996 DOI: 10.2307/1522899 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 140 |
Abstract
prominent citizens of the mind, and beliefs are individuated in terms of what they are beliefs about. I know of no plausible psychosemantics, no plausible theory of what makes one thing about another, that isn't externalist in character. It is the relations -causal, informational, historical, or whateverthat, on a given Sunday afternoon, makes something in my brain about football rather than philosophy. Thoughts are in the head, but what makes them the thoughts they are is not there.
Citations in the library
Cited by 12
- Mental Paint and Mental Latex Philosophical Issues 1996
- Perception and Iconic Memory: What Sperling Doesn't Show Mind & Language September 1, 2011
- IN DEFENSE OF THE WHAT‐IT‐IS‐LIKENESS OF EXPERIENCE The Southern Journal of Philosophy September 1, 2011
- Not in the Mood for Intentionalism Midwest Studies in Philosophy September 1, 2017
- Seeing through Transparency July 7, 2023
and 7 more in the library