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A hundred years of consciousness: “a long training in absurdity”

G. Strawson

Estudios de Filosofía January 1, 2019 DOI: 10.17533/udea.ef.n59a02 (opens in new tab) via Semantic Scholar

Summary

AI-generated from the abstract

In the twentieth century, some thinkers denied the existence of consciousness, a phenomenon the author calls the Denial. Others considered the Denial possibly true. This paper documents aspects of this episode, focusing on the development of two forms of the Denial—philosophical behaviorism and functionalism in the philosophy of mind—from psychological methodological behaviorism, which does not involve the Denial. It also examines a materialist or physicalist naturalism that wrongly takes naturalism to entail the Denial.

Study at a glance

Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Keywords Philosophy
Citations 41
Key finding Argues that the denial of consciousness in twentieth-century thought arose from a mistaken view that naturalism entails materialism or physicalism.

Abstract

There occurred in the twentieth century the most remarkable episode in the history of human thought. A number of thinkers denied the existence of something we know with certainty to exist: consciousness, conscious experience. Others held back from the Denial, as we may call it, but claimed that it might be true—a claim no less remarkable than the Denial. This paper documents some aspects of this episode, with particular reference to two things. First, the development of two views which are forms of the Denial —philosophical behaviourism, and functionalism considered as a doctrine in the philosophy of mind— from a view that does not in any way involve the Denial: psychological methodological behaviourism. Second, the rise of a way of understanding naturalism —materialist or physicalist naturalism— that wrongly takes naturalism to entail the Denial.

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