The Phenomenal Intentionality Theory

Abstract

This chapter introduces the phenomenal intentionality theory ( PIT ), on which all original intentionality arises from phenomenal consciousness. It argues that PIT succeeds precisely where its main competitors, the tracking and functional role theories discussed in previous chapters, fail. The version of PIT that this chapter and the remainder of the book defends is strong identity PIT , on which all intentionality arises from phenomenal consciousness ( strong PIT ), and (roughly) phenomenal states give rise to intentional states simply by being identical to them ( identity PIT ). In short, according to strong identity PIT, every intentional state is identical to a phenomenal state. This chapter closes by previewing how later chapters handle certain challenging cases for PIT, including those of thoughts, states with broad or object-involving contents, standing states, and nonconscious occurrent states. The recommended treatment rejects derived intentionality and so qualifies as a version of strong PIT.