Consciousness is not a natural kind
J. Van Brakel
Behavioral and Brain Sciences June 1, 1995 DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x00038437 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that the distinction between "phenomenal feel" consciousness and "thought/cognition" consciousness is a cultural construction, and that consciousness and its "subspecies" are not a natural kind. Crosscultural data are presented in support of this claim. |
Abstract
AbstractBlocks distinction between “phenomenal feel” consciousness and “thought/cognition” consciousness is a cultural construction. Consciousness (and its “subspecies”) is not a natural kind. Some crosscultural data are presented to support this.
Citations in the library
Cites 7
- Consciousness in Contemporary Science Oxford University Press eBooks March 12, 1992
- Sensations: A Defense of Type Materialism. The Philosophical Review October 1, 1993
- What is wrong with appendage theory of consciousness Philosophical Psychology 1993
- Lovely and Suspect Ideas Philosophy and Phenomenological Research December 1, 1993
- Sensations January 25, 1991
and 2 more in the library