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Phenomenal Consciousness and Access Consciousness Are Different in Kind

Daniel Derome

preprint DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.4582064 (opens in new tab)

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AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper
Key points Argues that phenomenal and access consciousness differ in kind and that an intermediate diachronic subdivision, identified through paleoanthropology and the development of abstraction, bridges the gap between them; this bridge, absorbed by access consciousness, constitutes the break between the two types.

Abstract

The distinction between phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness, advocated in particular by Ned Block, provides a more detailed understanding of the consciousness phenomenon. For obvious reasons, which we shall now present, the two types of consciousness differ in kind. This raises the question of the emergence, development and natural selection of access consciousness. Considering that consciousness, whether access or phenomenal, is made up of abstract entities, we will approach the question by following the thread of the development of the faculty of abstraction. Thanks to the knowledge accumulated in paleoanthropology, we are going to identify an intermediate diachronic subdivision that bridges the gap between phenomenal and access consciousness. It is this missing bridge, absorbed by access consciousness, that constitutes the break between the latter and phenomenal consciousness.