Layered Perceptual Representation
Philosophical Issues 1996 DOI: 10.2307/1522894 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 50 |
| Key points | Argues that the position Ned Block labeled the "fallacy of intentionalizing qualia" is defensible, and frames the paper as part of a larger project to establish the "Hegemony of Representation," a weak version of Brentano's doctrine that the mental and the intentional are one. |
Abstract
My purpose in this paper is to commit a fallacy. -Or rather, to continue defending a position of mine that has been rather grandly labelled a fallacy, by Ned Block (1990, p. 55), who calls it fallacy of intentionalizing qualia. But more on the labelling business very shortly. 1. My present effort is part of a larger project: to secure what I call the Hegemony of Representation. That thesis is a weak version of Brentano's doctrine that the mental and the intentional are one and