Perceptual Experience and Physicalism
Purpose and Procedure in Philosophy of Perception June 10, 2021 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198853534.003.0007 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that representationalism, the leading account of perception, fails to meet the physicalist criteria it was designed to satisfy, and that the alternative view of non-relationalism has difficulty doing justice to the idea that perceptual experiences are assessable for accuracy or veridicality. |
Abstract
AbstractAlthough there is much disagreement within the philosophy of perception, there is one thing that the majority of philosophers agree on: our philosophical account of perceptual experience should be compatible with physicalism. The aim of this paper is to explore the impact this has had within the philosophy of perception, and to point out some of the problems a physicalist approach must face. Representationalism is the leading account of perception, and was developed precisely to meet the physicalist’s criteria. This chapter supports and expands on an existing argument that representationalism fails in this aim. It then points out a problem with the new view—non-relationalism—which has arisen as a result of the failure of standard representationalism to qualify as a genuinely physicalist view. Non-relationalist accounts have difficulty doing justice to the idea that our perceptual experiences are assessable for accuracy or veridicality.