P-Consciousness presentation/A-Consciousness representation
Behavioral and Brain Sciences March 1, 1997 DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x97250053 (opens in new tab)
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractP-consciousness (P) is an immediate fluctuating continuum of raw experiential matter, while A-consciousness (A) acts to objectify and impose form, making contents thinkable. A representationalizes P, but P itself is not representational under certain concepts of representation. Block's arguments do not establish that P is representational, and given his cognitive science assumptions, he cannot account for the phenomenal content he claims goes beyond representational content. The BBS discussion shows the need for greater analysis and justification for a representationalist thesis of P.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key finding | Argues that phenomenal consciousness is non-representational and that Block's arguments fail to establish it as representational. |
Abstract
P-Consciousness (P) is to be understood in terms of an immediate fluctuating continuum that is a presentation of raw experiential matter against which A-consciousness (A) acts to objectify, impose form or make determinate “thinkable” contents. A representationalises P but P is not itself representational, at least in terms of some concepts of “representation.” Block's arguments fall short of establishing that P is representational and, given the sort of cognitive science assumptions he is working with, he is unable to account for the aspect of phenomenal content that he thinks goes beyond “representational” content. BBS discussion reveals the need for greater analysis and justification for a representationalist thesis of P.