Descartes' Dualism and Contemporary Dualism
Cecilia Wee, Michael Pelczar
The Southern Journal of Philosophy March 1, 2008 DOI: 10.1111/j.2041-6962.2008.tb00073.x (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that Descartes is a numerical dualist but not a modal dualist, and that his views relate to contemporary philosophy of mind in more complex ways than commonly assumed. |
Abstract
AbstractAfter drawing a distinction between two kinds of dualism—numerical dualism (defined in terms of identity) and modal dualism (defined in terms of supervenience)—we argue that Descartes is a numerical dualist, but not a modal dualist. Since most contemporary dualists advocate modal dualism, the relation of Descartes' views to the contemporary philosophy of mind are more complex than is commonly assumed.