On Dualism: How to Reconcile Descartes and Spinoza
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AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that a single, infinite substance underlies reality, supporting Spinoza's substance monism but rejecting his immanent doctrine, and that reality is dualistic without two distinct substances. Mind and body arise from one substance but are organized in distinct modes, described as 'private history' and 'public history', belonging to separate Abelian and non-Abelian realms. |
Abstract
This article deals with the philosophy of mind. We revisit the old intellectual conflict between Spinoza's immanent philosophy and Descartes' transcendence. Based on modern physics and recent scientific discoveries, we explain how a single, infinite substance manifests in two distinct realities: the immaterial and the material. Thus, we justify Spinoza's substance monism but reject his immanent doctrine. In parallel, we rectify Descartes' dualism, asserting a dualistic reality rather than the concept of two distinct substances. We conclude that, despite the world's adherence to substance monism, reality is dualistic. Mind and body arise from a single substance but have distinct modes of organization-what British philosopher Gilbert Ryle ironically labeled 'private history' and public history'. The two entities are indeed distinct and belong to two separate realms: one Abelian and the other non-Abelian.