Two Forms of Dualism
Dialogue June 1, 2011 DOI: 10.1017/s0012217311000369 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 1 |
| Key points | Argues that there are two distinct motivations for dualism—one based on conscious phenomenology and another based on normativity—and that these are relatively independent rather than sharing a common source. |
Abstract
ABSTRACT: I distinguish two sorts of motivation for dualism. One motivation is driven by the distinctive character of conscious phenomenology. The other is driven by the special character of normativity: Is rationality an even “harder” problem than consciousness? There is no dramatic climax in which I show that these two dualist currents have a common source; in fact, I think they are relatively independent.