The problem of consciousness: Recent Cartesianism

Abstract

The article contains a historical-philosophical review of recent receptions of Cartesian substantial dualism as an approach to solve the mind-body problem. It examines the genesis of Descartes’ dualistic metaphysics, its core arguments (including the modal argument of conceivability), and its characteristic systematic challenges such as the problem of the causal interaction between heterogeneous substances (the so-called ‘scandal of interactionism’). The author considers alternative interpretations of the Descartes’ approach and the Cartesianism: interactionism, occasionalism and concurrentism. Particular attention is paid to the critique of the substance dualism in contemporary debates like the problem of other minds, epistemic asymmetry, mereological arguments, and the thesis of conceptual autonomy of the mental. It is shown that substance dualism, despite its internal contradictions, remains the starting point for most recent dualist and physicalist conceptions of consciousness.