It Must be True – But How Can it Be? Some Remarks on Panpsychism and Mental Composition
Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement July 7, 2010 DOI: 10.1017/s1358246110000044 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 33 |
| Key points | Argues that panpsychism deserves serious consideration, possibly as the only genuine form of physicalism, but faces the 'composition problem' of explaining how fundamental experiences combine into unified human experience. Questions whether mental composition is impossible in principle or simply not yet understood. |
Abstract
Abstract Although panpsychism has had a very long history, one that goes back to the very origin of western philosophy, its force has only recently been appreciated by analytic philosophers of mind. And even if many still reject the theory as utterly absurd, others have argued that it is the only genuine form of physicalism. This paper examines the case for panpsychism and argues that there are at least goodprima faciereasons for taking it seriously. In a second step, the paper discusses the main difficulty the theory has to face, the ‘composition problem’. This is the problem of explaining how the primitive experiences that are supposed to exist at the ultimate level of reality could give rise to the unified experience of a human being. What assumptions as to the nature of experience generate the composition problem? Is mental composition impossible in principle or do we simply lack at present any understanding of phenomenal parts and wholes?