Panpsychism’s Combination Problem Is a Problem for Everyone
The Routledge Handbook of Panpsychism December 10, 2019 DOI: 10.4324/9781315717708-25 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that the combination problem facing panpsychism is similar in kind to combination problems that confront all theories of mind, including phenomenal unity, mental structure, and new quality spaces. Proposes the "ignorance hypothesis"—that we are ignorant of key facts about mental combination—which lets panpsychists avoid certain objections based on the combination problem. |
Abstract
The most pressing worry for panpsychism is arguably the combination problem , the problem of intelligibly explaining how the experiences of microphysical entities combine to form the experiences of macrophysical entities such as ourselves. This chapter argues that the combination problem is similar in kind to other problems of mental combination that are problems for everyone: the problem of phenomenal unity, the problem of mental structure, and the problem of new quality spaces. The ubiquity of combination problems suggests the ignorance hypothesis , the hypothesis that we are ignorant of certain key facts about mental combination, which allows the panpsychist to avoid certain objections based on the combination problem.
Citations in the library
Cited by 3
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- Conscious Subjects, Conscious Unity, and Five Arguments for Anti-Combination Combining Minds February 20, 2019