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A Reply to S Siddharth’s ‘Against Phenomenal Bonding’

Gregory M. Miller

European Journal of Analytic Philosophy April 15, 2024 DOI: 10.31820/ejap.18.1.4 (opens in new tab) via DOAJ

Summary

AI-generated from the abstract

Panpsychism, the view that consciousness is a fundamental feature of all physical things, faces the subject summing argument: how do many tiny subjects of experience combine into one larger subject? The phenomenal bonding response claims that subjects combine through a special form of unity. A recent argument claimed this response is question-begging and should lead to rejecting constitutive panpsychism. This reply argues that the objection is unsound, defending the phenomenal bonding approach against the charge of circularity.

Study at a glance

Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Keywords Panpsychism Combination problem Phenomenal bonding Subject summing Combinationism
Key finding Argues that Siddharth's argument against constitutive panpsychism is unsound.

Abstract

In this journal S Siddharth has recently argued that the phenomenal bonding response to the subject summing argument for panpsychism is question begging, therefore we should reject constitutive forms of panpsychism. The argument specifically focuses on the proposals of Goff and Miller. In this reply, I show that the argument is unsound.

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